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Abstract:  The proposed mechanism for jamming attack detection for wireless sensor 
networks is novel in three respects: firstly, it upgrades the jammer to include versatile 
military jammers; secondly, it graduates from the existing node-centric detection system to 
the network-centric system making it robust and economical at the nodes, and thirdly, it 
tackles the problem through fuzzy inference system, as the decision regarding intensity of 
jamming is seldom crisp. The system with its high robustness, ability to grade nodes with 
jamming indices, and its true-detection rate as high as 99.8%, is worthy of consideration for 
information warfare defense purposes. 
Keywords:  wireless sensor networks; jamming detection; fuzzy inference system; 
information warfare 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A large number of wireless sensor networks (WSN)-based applications typically employ numerous 
inexpensive tiny nodes with on-board sensor(s). They have very limited memory space, energy, and 
computational power and are interconnected with simplex radio where each node itself acts as a router. 
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The communication is generally limited between a node (source) and the cluster-head/base-station 
(sink). Since the nodes operate at very low radio power, typically, the transmitted power being a few 
milli-watts, and the communication range being limited to tens of meters, they are extremely 
vulnerable to jamming attacks at the physical and data link layers. However, this extreme vulnerability 
of the WSN to jamming is only one side of the coin. The other side is that, because it is so vulnerable, 
it is malleable too, and can take the imprint of the jammed area on itself, owing to its high density, 
spread, and synergy. WSN are, therefore, very suitable for hunting jammers, i.e., detecting, localizing 
and tracking the jammers for the latter’s eventual liquidation in an information war, which otherwise, 
is a very costly and difficult task. 
 
1.1. Motivation 
 
The authors have chequered experiences of more than twenty-eight years as information warriors, 
teachers, and researchers and find that detecting the jamming conditions and using it to localize the 
jammer is a complex and costly affair with the existing technology. WSN have vast military 
applications for tactical battle field surveillance. However, the same cannot be done effectively 
because of its high vulnerability to jamming. The authors are motivated to convert this weakness of the 
WSN into its unique strength of detecting and localizing the jammer. We, therefore, take on the 
problem of jamming detection in this paper, as our first effort, towards exploiting the potential of WSN 
in hunting for the jammer in an information war. 
There is a special motivation to the approach to the problem too. The existing methods [1-6] of 
detecting the jamming conditions are node-centric, where the complete data collection, processing and 
decision making is done by individual nodes to arrive at a crisp decision of ‘jammed’ or ‘not jammed’. 
This approach is not suitable in a hostile environment because, like wounded soldiers and damaged 
equipment who/which are graded according to the severity of the casualty/damage, the nodes too must 
be graded with different jamming indices as per the severity of jamming affecting them. This would 
make the employment and deployment of the WSN nodes, like any other battle resource, economic and 
flexible to suit different stages of the information warfare. The other serious drawback of the existing 
approaches is that the complete processing and decision making is done at the node level. This is not 
practicable as the WSN nodes are resource-starved and that because nodes may not be able to 
communicate with others during jamming. Therefore, the authors are motivated to change the approach 
from decision-making being node-centric to base-station-centric and from the decision being crisp-
centric to fuzzy-centric.  
 
1.2. Paper Layout 
 
We begin with the discussion of various types of existing jamming attack models in Section 2, such 
as those from Xu [1], Muraleedharan [2], and Cakiroglu [3]. We then discuss the military classification 
of jammers, and finally, select our own models relevant to our study from the plethora of existing ones. 
Section 3 is the study of different possible metrics used for jamming detection and selection of some of 
them for our work. In Section 4, we analyze the effectiveness and suitability of the existing jamming 
detection methods, as relevant to the WSN in an information war environment. Section 5 is the Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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description of our proposed mechanism for detecting jamming as well as the type of jammer, followed 
by the description of the simulation set-up involving NS2, MATLAB, and Simulink simulators in 
Section 6. In Section 7, we present the performance evaluation of our model and compare it to the 
other existing ones. We then conclude and outline the future work with Section 8. 
 
1.3. Contributions 
 
Our work has a different approach to the problem of detecting jamming, facilitating other jamming 
related works such as jammed area mapping, jammer localization and tracking and consequent 
decision making for different anti-jamming actions for various tactical operations. The major 
contributions are listed as follows: 
  Contour mapping, based on different lower cut-off values of jamming indices of nodes of the 
WSN (akin to altitude contours on a geographical relief map) is made possible. This is a better 
alternative to the present trend of plotting the jammed area, as recommended by different authors 
such as Wood et al. [7], Nowak et al. [8], Hellerstein et al. [9], and others, because instead of 
dividing the geographical extent of the WSN into jammed and non-jammed areas, it provides a 
jamming gradient to the whole area. 
  Flexibility in extent of jammed area mapping is possible which would give more working space 
to the battle field commander, e.g., in a defensive battle, during the pre-contact-with-enemy 
stage, when the density and health of the WSN is the best, the jammed area may be bounded by 
a contour of jamming index of 75% (say) and the same may expand to 50% and 25% during the 
contact-with-enemy stage and counter-attack stage, as the battle progresses and the density and 
health of the WSN goes on depleting. 
  Holistic decision regarding the jammed condition of a node, based on the node parameters and 
its neighborhood conditions is taken at the base station, and not at the node level, as done in the 
existing methods. This not only improves the quality of the decision and survivality of the 
decision making process, but also takes off the extra burden of taking such decisions from the 
already resource-starved nodes under siege of a jammer. 
 
2. Jamming Attack Models 
 
2.1. Military Models for Electronic Warfare 
 
Military jammers have no constraints of energy (power supply) or radiated frequency (RF) power 
and liberally use their resources with the philosophy of crushing the pea-nut (target network) with the 
sledge hammer (brute RF power). However, they do exercise restraint and use less RF power only to 
evade detection. There are three basic jamming attack models used in electronic warfare by the 
military:  
  Spot Jammer is a jammer which knows the exact radio frequency of the target network, and 
attacks the network on that frequency (spot frequency) only. It requires less power to jam the 
network, and is the most efficient and effective jammer. However, it suffers from the Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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disadvantage that the target network can change the frequency (channel surfing/frequency 
hopping) to evade jamming. 
  Sweep Jammer is a jammer which does not know the target frequency, and therefore sweeps 
across the probable spectrum either periodically or aperiodically, thus jamming the affected 
networks temporarily. They are less efficient and effective than the spot jammer, but can attack 
several networks and impose restrictions on freedom of frequency-hopping by the target 
network. 
  Barrage Jammers cover a large bandwidth of the radio spectrum at a time, leaving very little 
scope for the target network to evade jamming. Also, they can jam a number of networks 
simultaneously. Barrage jammers require high RF power to maintain the required power 
spectral density of jamming. 
2.2. Jamming Attack Models from Academia 
 
2.2.1. Models of Xu et al. [1] 
 
Xu et al. [1] have suggested four types of models, described below: 
  Constant Jammer is not aware of the existing protocols of the network (bit-rate, packet-size 
etc.) and, therefore keeps transmitting bits constantly over a period of time without following 
any protocol. They are not energy efficient. 
  Deceptive Jammer is aware of the target network’s protocol and jams the network by 
transmitting legitimate packets constantly over a period at a high rate to keep the carrier 
captured. It is highly effective but is as energy inefficient as the constant jammer. 
  Random Jammer functions either like a constant jammer or a deceptive jammer but does so 
randomly. It is less effective than the jammer whom it imitates (constant or deceptive) but is 
more energy efficient than it. 
  Reactive Jammer also knows the communication protocols of the target network. It keeps 
listening to the network passively, and attacks the network at its chosen time in a manner as if it 
is part of the network, following its protocols. It is most effective but not very energy-efficient 
as it spends considerable amount of energy in constantly listening to the network. 
 
2.2.2. Models of Law et al. [11] 
 
The S-MAC protocol has these time segments: synchronization, listening, control, data, and sleep. 
Law  et al. [11] have suggested four types of energy-efficient jammers for attacking a network 
following the S-MAC protocol: 
  Periodic Listening Interval Jammer attacks when the nodes are in listening period and sleeps at all 
other times. 
  Periodic Control Interval Jammer attacks when the nodes are in the control period and sleeps 
during rest of the time. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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  Periodic Data Packet Jammer listens to the channel during the control interval and attacks the data 
segment. 
  Periodic Cluster Jammer is meant for attacking networks following encrypted packets. It uses 
k-means clustering algorithm to separate clusters of the network and statistical estimations to 
determine the timing of the data segment, and then attacks the same accordingly.  
2.2.3. Models of Wood et al. [12] 
Wood et al. [12] have also suggested four jamming attack models, described below: 
  Interrupt Jammer is a variation of Reactive Jammer in the sense that instead of listening to the 
channel constantly, it gets activated by means of a hardware interrupt when a preamble and 
start of frame delimiter (SFD) are detected from a received frame. 
  Activity Jammer is yet another variation of Interrupt Jammer (in fact, that of a Reactive 
Jammer) meant for encrypted packets where detection of the SFD is other-wise not possible. 
  Scan Jammer is similar to the Sweep Jammer. Instead of detecting a packet in a single channel, 
it searches out all possible channels for a packet during a defined period of time, and having 
succeeded, it then attacks the channel. 
  Pulse Jammer is akin to the Constant Jammer in the sense that it sends small packets 
constantly to jam a channel. 
2.2.4. Models of Muraleedharan et al. [2] 
Muraleedharan et al. [2] have described four models: Single-Tone Jammer, Multi-Tone Jammer, 
Pulsed-Noise Jammer, and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). The Single-Tone Jammer attacks one 
channel at a time (akin to Spot Jammer), the Multi-Tone Jammer can attack some or all the channels of 
a multi-channel receiver, while the Pulsed-Noise Jammer is a wide band jammer, sending pulsed 
jamming signals by turning on and off periodically at a slow or fast rate. ELINT, as they describe, is 
typically a passive system that tries to break down or analyze radar or communication TCF signals, 
and thus, strictly speaking, is not a jamming attack model. 
2.3. Analysis of the Existing Models 
Study of the aforesaid models reveals that while the military models are focused towards attacking 
the network at the physical layer (thus, attacking all the other upper six layers like shaking the 
foundation of a tall building and affecting all the upper storeys consequently) with RF power being 
their main weapon (since there are hardly any energy and RF power constraints), the academic models 
are focused towards attacking the data-link layer with RF power levels at par with the existing average 
transmitted power of a WSN node. It also brings to the forefront the difference in approach to 
identification of the attacker. The academics seems to believe that the attacker (jammer) is a small time 
player with limited resources, who is either an intruder or one of our own compromised nodes, fully or 
partially knowing the protocols, and attacking the network with stealth as its main weapon from a 
location well within the geographical extent of the WSN. The military believes that it is neither worth 
the effort to learn the WSN protocols nor essential to move into the WSN geographical area for Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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jamming, since it is so easy to jam the nodes with brute RF power from a far-off safe distance, 
especially when the RF frequency is known. Therefore, there is a need to balance the two approaches 
in modeling the jamming attack to make our counter-jamming efforts, like jamming detection and 
jammer localization, suitable for information warfare. 
 
2.4. Description of the Proposed Jamming Attack Models 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion and recognizing both, the jammer’s transmitted RF power and 
the knowledge/ignorance of the target network’s communication protocols to the jammer, we propose 
the following jamming attack models, which are in fact, the derivatives of the models proposed by Xu 
et al. [1], redefined to suit the information warfare requirements: 
1)  Constant Jammer with Normal Power (CON) is a constant jammer with transmitted RF power 
comparable with the average RF transmitted power of the target WSN.  
2)  Constant Jammer with High Power (COH) is a constant jammer with high transmitted RF 
power. 
3)  Deceptive Jammer with Normal Power (DECN) is a deceptive jammer with transmitted RF 
power comparable with the average RF transmitted power of the target WSN. 
4)  Deceptive Jammer with High Power (DECH) is a deceptive jammer with high transmitted RF 
power. 
5)  Random Jammer Imitating CON, (RACN). 
6)  Random Jammer Imitating COH, (RACH). 
7)  Random Jammer Imitating DECN, (RADECN). 
8)  Random Jammer Imitating DECH, (RADECH). 
9)  Reactive Jammer with Normal Power (REN) is a reactive jammer with transmitted RF power 
comparable with the average RF transmitted power of the target WSN. 
10) Reactive Jammer with High Power (REH) is a reactive jammer with high transmitted RF 
power. 
3. Metrics for Jamming Attack Detection 
Xu et al. [1] define a jammer ‘to be an entity who is purposefully trying to interfere with the 
physical transmission and reception of wireless communications’. This can be achieved by the jammer 
by attacking at the physical layer or at the data-link layer. At the physical layer, the jammer can only 
jam the receiver by transmitting at high power at the network frequency and lowering the signal-to-
noise ratio below the receiver’s threshold; however, it cannot prevent the transmitter from transmitting, 
and hence it cannot jam the transmitter. At the data link layer, it can jam the receiver by corrupting 
legitimate packets through protocol violations, and can also jam the transmitter by preventing it to 
transmit by capturing the carrier through continuous transmission (another form of protocol violation). 
With this modus operandi of the jammer at the background, we examine the suitability of various 
metrics, as suggested by different scholars, for detecting jamming attack on a WSN. 
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3.1. Carrier Sensing Time (CST) 
 
In Media Access Control (MAC) protocols, such as Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA), each 
node keeps sensing the time for the carrier to be free so that it can then send its own packets. The 
average, time period for which the node has to wait for the carrier (channel) to become free and 
available to it is called the Carrier Sensing Time (CST). It is calculated as the mean of the time 
duration elapsed between the instant a node is ready to send its packet and the instant at which the 
carrier is found free by it for sending its packet. The nodes fix a threshold value of the CST, which if 
exceeded, allows it to infer that there is a jamming attack aimed at capturing the carrier. The threshold 
can either be fixed, as in case of 1.1.1 MAC, or taken as the minimum value over a given time period, 
as done in case of BMAC. This metric can be applied to only those networks using a MAC protocol 
based on carrier sensing. Also, this metric is incapable of indicating a physical layer power attack. It 
also suffers from the problem of fixing thresholds, which is an imprecise process and is 
computationally taxing on the scarce resources of the WSN node. We therefore, do not find it suitable 
for our system. 
 
3.2. Packet Send Ratio (PSR) 
 
Xu et al. [1] define PSR of a node as the ratio of the number of packets actually sent by the node 
during a given time period to the number of packets intended to be sent by the node during that given 
period. ‘The number of packets intended to be sent during a given time period’ is found by calculating 
the time of the channel’s availability to the node during the given period, much in the same way as in 
the case of CST, and then by multiplying this available time with the packet transmission rate. Finally, 
the PSR is calculated as defined above. The PSR-calculation is cumbersome and accordingly, we do 
not find it suitable for our system either. 
 
3.3. Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) 
 
Both, Xu et al. [1] and Cakiroglu et al. [3] define PDR as the ratio of the number of packets 
successfully sent out by the node (i.e., the number of packets for which the node has got the 
acknowledgement from the destination) to the total number of packets sent out by the node. Xu et al. [1], 
however, define two types of PDR: firstly, one to be measured by the transmitter (source), and 
secondly, one to be measured at the receiver (sink). We, while talking of the PDR, mean only the first 
one, i.e., the one measured at the transmitter-end, and shall discuss the second type, i.e., the one to be 
measured at the receiver-end, separately. The PDR is calculated by keeping counts of the 
acknowledgements of the successfully delivered packets and the total number of packets sent by the 
node and then by finding their ratio as a percentage. PDR is a very good metric which is capable of 
being measured accurately by the node without much of computational overhead, and can indicate the 
presence of all types of jamming attacks at the physical or data-link/MAC layer. However, the 
necessary condition is that the network must follow a protocol, like TCP, where the system of 
acknowledgement of packets exists. We feel that a resource- starved network, like the WSN, cannot 
afford the luxury of acknowledgements, and hence reject it from our choice. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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3.4. Bad Packet Ratio (BPR) 
 
BPR is same as that PDR which is to be measured at the receiver-end, as suggested by Xu et al. [1]. 
However, Cakiroglu et al. [3] call it BPR and define BPR as the ratio of the number of bad packets 
received by a node (i.e., the number of received packets which have not passed the Cyclic Redundancy 
Check (CRC) carried out by the node) to the total number of packets received by the node over a given 
period of time. We find BPR to be a very effective metric which can indicate all types of jamming, is 
easily calculable, and is fit for WSN where the system of acknowledgements is not required. The CRC 
is a normal procedure which nodes have to do under most of the existing protocols to check whether a 
received packet is correct or erroneous. If the packet is correct (good packet), it is received or queued 
for further transmission, and if the packet is erroneous (bad packet), it is dropped and their count is 
maintained. Therefore, both values, the number of bad packets and the number of total received 
packets, are readily available for computing the BPR without imposing any significant burden on the 
system. Also, there is no sampling or fixing of thresholds involved here. We find this metric suitable 
for our system. 
 
3.5. Standard Deviation in Received Signal Strength (SDRSS) 
 
Reese et al. [4] have suggested a system where the node samples its received legitimate signal, 
called the clean signal, over a period of time and finds its standard deviation (σ) during the period. It 
then samples the abnormal signal, called the jammed signal, and finds its mean deviation (đ) from the 
clean signal over the same period of time. The calculation of σ and đ are done as per formulae [4]. If  
đ ≤ σ, then there is no jamming; else, there is jamming. Although we will discuss SDRSS subsequently 
under the method suggested by Reese et al. [4] , we do not find it suitable for the WSN due to: (1) it 
cannot work if the jammer is transmitting at a power level equal to the normal transmitted power level 
of the nodes, as it would do during many types of jamming attacks, like deceptive jamming, as 
discussed above, (2) it involves sampling at the node level, and (3) it is computationally taxing for a 
WSN node. 
 
3.6. Bit Error Rate (BER) 
 
Strasser et al. [5] have recommended the use of BER in combination with the received signal 
strength (RSS), as it is not only a very effective metric for detecting jamming attack, but is also 
capable of identifying the reactive jamming attack, which otherwise is very difficult to identify. The 
BER is calculated as the ratio of the number of corrupted bits to the number of total bits received by a 
node during a transmission session. We concur with the authors as far as the effectiveness of this 
metric is concerned, but find the calculation of the BER heavily taxing for a WSN node, especially in a 
networking environment where the node will have to keep track of the BER of all radio links with its 
one-hop neighbors. Calculation and updating of BER, even at the base station level, is not feasible 
because it involves collection of voluminous data regarding every bit of a valid and invalid packet 
from the nodes leading to over-taxing of the WSN. 
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3.7. Received Signal Strength (RSS) 
 
The received signal strength is defined as the power content of the radio signal received at the 
receiver. It is a measurable quantity and can either be measured by the RF power meter of the node or 
can be calculated using formulae as per the selected propagation model. The RSS by itself is not a 
logical metric to indicate jamming. However, when used in combination with metrics like the received 
jammer power (or noise power) or BER, it forms an effective combination to detect jamming. 
 
3.8. Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) or Signal-to Jammer Power Ratio (SJR)  
 
Although there is a subtle difference between SNR and SJR, we have considered these to be the 
same because, in our model jammer is the predominant noise source, and have used these terms 
interchangeably. SNR is calculated as the ratio of the received signal power at a node to the received 
noise power (or jammer power) at the node. It is almost an effective metric to identify a jamming 
attack at the physical layer as there can be no jamming at the physical layer without the SNR dropping 
low. However, some other metrics like PDR, BPR, or BER which can identify a data-link/MAC layer 
attack should be used with SNR for making it almost full- proof to detect jamming. 
 
3.9. Energy Consumption Amount (ECA) 
 
Cakiroglu et al. [3] define ECA as the approximated energy amount consumed in a specified time 
for a sensor network. It can be calculated by measuring the drop in the battery (power-supply) voltage 
(v) of the node and multiplying its squared value with the time duration and then by dividing the result 
with the average electrical load (resistance) of the node. The authors argue that certain jammers force 
sensor nodes to remain in BACKOFF period even if they should have switched to IDLE mode, causing 
them to consume more energy than the normal. They suggest that this consequence can be used to 
distinguish the normal and jamming scenarios from each other. This metric has two pit falls: firstly, the 
sampling of the threshold energy consumptions of the node by itself under different traffic-load 
conditions is a tall order, and secondly, there may not be any perceptible energy consumption 
differential when the jammer is attacking in a way which does not involve the carrier capture, or when 
the jammer is resorting to simple power attack. 
 
3.10. Selected Metrics for the Proposed System—SNR and BPR 
 
We select SNR and BPR as the jamming attack metrics for our system. However, we prefer to call 
the BPR as Packets Dropped per Terminal (PDPT) because our PDPT is the average BPR of a node 
during a simulation cycle. The reasons for this choice have been discussed above, and the same are 
summarized as follows: 
  The received radio power at a node is easily measurable as nodes are/can be provided with RF 
power meter. 
  In our system, the node simply keeps the base station informed about the received radio power, 
at a time interval as decided by the base station. The base station calculates the jammer (noise) Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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power by subtracting the average legitimate signal power of the node from the current power. 
The ratio of the two powers is then calculated by the base to get the SNR. Thus there are no over-
heads involved at the node level. 
  The node keeps the base station informed about the number of good packets and total packets 
received by it during a time interval, as decided by the base station, in a normal routine way. 
The base station calculates the BPR (or, PDPT) for each node. Thus, the nodes are not 
burdened additionally. 
  The combination of SNR and BPR (or, PDPT) is capable of detecting any form of jamming 
attack, as discussed in the previous sections. 
 
4. Existing Jamming Attack Detection Methods and Their Analysis 
 
Several scholars have suggested different mechanisms to detect jamming attacks. All of these 
suggested mechanisms are to be implemented at the individual node level to crisply conclude whether 
the node is jammed or not. Their technique is either based on threshold values of some of the metrics, 
as discussed before, or to use digital signal processing techniques to differentiate between a legitimate 
signal and an illegitimate (jamming) signal and thus conclude about the presence or absence of the 
jammer. Few of the methods use comparison of the node conditions with those of its neighbors to fine-
tune their findings. We discuss the existing solutions, as proposed by different scholars in the 
following sub-sections. 
 
4.1. Studies by Xu et al. [1]  
 
Xu et al. [1] carried out intense study of the jamming attack detection mechanism with experiments 
using the MICA2 Mote platform. Firstly, they collected data about various percentages of the PSR and 
PDR (measured at the transmitter end) for constant, deceptive, random, and reactive jammers for 
BMAC and 1.1.1 MAC protocols for varying distances between the transmitting-node and the jammer. 
They considered additional jammer parameters like on-off periods for the random jammer and 
different packet sizes for the reactive jammer. The results show that although the PSR and the PDR 
vary for different jammers under different conditions, it is difficult to conclude about jamming and its 
type by these parameters alone. They then studied the levels of carrier sensing time, energy 
consumption, and the received signal strength as well as the received signal spectrum under normal 
and jamming conditions for two application layer protocols: Constant Bit Rate (CBR) and Maximum 
Traffic and tried to identify the jammer type through spectral discrimination using the Higher Order 
Crossing (HOC) method [14]. They conclude through these experiments that it is not always possible 
to use simple statistics, such as average signal strength, energy, or carrier sensing time to discriminate 
jamming condition from the normal traffic, because it is difficult to devise thresholds. They also 
conclude that the HOC method can distinguish the constant and deceptive jamming from the normal 
traffic, but cannot distinguish the random and reactive jamming from the normal traffic. Finally, they 
conclude that if PDR is used with consistency checks like, checking own PDR and signal strength and 
comparing the same with those of the neighbors , and/or ascertaining own distances from the 
neighbors, then the combination can very effectively detect and discriminate various forms of jamming. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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The study is rigorous and the suggested methodology is sound. Its limitations are: (1) the complete 
process has to be done by the WSN node which is taxing, and (2) that the node may not be able to 
communicate with its neighbors during jamming to get the required statistics for comparison, as 
required in the method. 
 
4.2. Method Suggested by Rajani et al. [2] 
 
Rajani et al. use ‘the swarm intelligence and ant system’ wherein they create an agent (ant) which 
proactively uses the WSN node’s information (key performance parameters), as it traverses a route 
from node to node, to predict or anticipate jamming, and accordingly, changes the route to avoid 
jamming. They suggest a decision threshold, called probability of selecting a link between nodes i and 
j, called Pij, to be calculated at node i. They describe that if the calculated Pij is within the acceptable 
limits then the agent selects the link for its travel, else, it rejects it and selects that link whose Pij is 
within the acceptable limits. Pij, as suggested by them, is to be calculated using complicated formulae. 
Although, the approach to the problem is novel, it is obvious that it is not workable for detecting a 
jamming attack, especially in an information warfare environment , because: (1) some of the data , 
e.g., packet delivery ratio and the packet loss on a link will not be readily available normally, and if 
they are to be kept readily available, they will be at the cost of memory space of the node, (2) some of 
the data, like BER,are extremely complicated to be ascertained (as already mentioned and to be 
described in detail later) and involve communicating with other nodes, which may not be possible 
under jamming, (3) it is computation-intensive and taxes the resource-starved WSN node, (4) it 
involves of fixing threshold of the decision parameter for each node under different conditions, which 
is fraught with pit-falls, as discussed earlier, and (5) it is based on evolutionary algorithms whose 
complexities in terms of time and space is difficult to ascertain; but are important to be minimized for 
any resource-constrained network, like the WSN. 
 
4.3. Method Suggested by Cakiroglu et al. [3] 
 
Cakiroglu  et al. [3] have proposed two algorithms for detecting a jamming attack. The first 
algorithm is based on threshold values of three detection parameters: Bad Packet Ratio (BPR), Packet 
Delivery Ratio (PDR), and Energy Consumption Amount (ECA). If all three parameters are below the 
thresholds, or if only the PDR exceeds the threshold, then it is concluded that there is no jamming; 
otherwise, there is jamming. The second algorithm is an improvement over the first one where the 
neighboring nodes’ conditions, ascertained through queries to be raised and replies there-to to be 
received within the threshold time periods, are also taken into account to enhance the jamming 
detection rate. The results of the simulations are very encouraging, thus establishing the effectiveness 
of the algorithms. However, the suggested models suffer from fixing of too many thresholds and 
processing at the node levels, which have their own problems, as discussed earlier. In addition, the 
PDR, measured at the transmitter-end, as in the instant case, is not suitable for the resource-constrained 
WSN because it imposes the avoidable burden of acknowledgements. 
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4.4. Method Suggested by Reese et al. [4] 
 
Reese et al. [4] have proposed a method to differentiate a legitimate received signal, called clean 
signal, c(t) from a signal received from a jammer, called jammed signal, j(t) based on the standard 
deviation of the clean signal, σ and the mean difference between the clean and jammed signals,d, 
averaged over a period of time t from t = a to t = b, where, a and b are chosen constants. They first 
compute the root mean square value of the clean signal, Crms, and then use it for other computations.  
If  d  is greater than σ, they conclude that it is a jamming signal; else, it is a clean signal. As evident, 
the calculations have to be done by the WSN node over a period of time (from t = a to t = b), very 
frequently, almost all the time, to keep differentiating the clean and jammed signals. This is a great 
disadvantage of this method, if used for jamming detection in the WSN scenario. Also, it cannot 
discriminate a jamming signal, if the jammer uses the same power in the jamming signal as that in the 
clean signal.  
 
4.5. Method Suggested by Strasser et al. [5] 
 
Strasser et al. [5] have suggested a very effective method of detecting a reactive jammer ( which 
otherwise is so difficult to be detected) through Received Signal Strength (RSS) and Bit Error Rate 
(BER) samplings and inferring the presence of the reactive jammer in the event of high BER despite 
the RSS being normal or better than the normal. The method involves three steps: (1) error sample 
acquisition, (2) interference detection, and (3) sequential jamming test to infer presence or absence of 
reactive jamming.  
Error sample acquisition is done in two sub-steps: (a) packet reception and RSS recording, i.e., 
forming the tuple (m, s), where, m is the sampled message packet and s is the corresponding RSS, and 
(b) identifying the BER.  
They have suggested three methods for ascertaining whether a bit is correct or erroneous: (i) by 
XOR-ing the instant bit, m(i) with the predetermined value of the bit, m’(i) and concluding that the 
instant bit is faulty if the XOR result is true, (ii) using Error Correcting Codes (ECC), and (iii) through 
wired node chain (n-tuples) system, in which they generate error sample, e(i) as the result of theXOR 
of the bit received on the wireless link ,wl(i) and the bit received by the same node from the same 
transmitter, transmitted simultaneously on a wired link, w(i), i.e., e(i) = wl(i) XOR w(i), and take the 
minimum of the RSSs received on the wireless and the wired links as the corresponding RSS, i.e.,  
s(i) = min [swl(i), sw(i)] and form tuple [e(i), s(i)]. 
In the second step, interference detection, they confirm the presence of interference if e (i) = 1 
(true) and s (i) > S, where S is a predetermined threshold value of the RSS, and confirm absence of 
interference otherwise. 
In the third step, sequential jamming test, they take decision regarding presence or absence of 
jamming based on the values of three decision parameters: likelihood ratio η(k), targeted probability of 
false alarm being true TFP, and targeted probability of false alarm being not true TFN. 
The method has a sound mathematical foundation and is capable of detecting all types of jamming 
attacks, including reactive jamming, but it cannot discriminate different types of jamming attacks. It 
also involves of sampling/fixing thresholds and values like those for pc, T FN, TFP, and S, the RSS Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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threshold, which have peculiar problems, as discussed before. Besides, it is taxing on a WSN node in 
terms of computational and memory-space resources. 
 
4.6. Comparison of Existing Methods 
 
A comparative study of the existing jamming detection methods is as given in Table 1. 
Table 1. A comparative study of existing jamming detection methods. 
Comparison parameter  Xu et al. Rajani  et al. Cakiroglu et al. Reese  et al. Strasser  et al. 
Jamming detection done by  Individual 
nodes 
Individual 
nodes 
Individual nodes  Individual 
nodes 
Individual 
nodes 
Requirement for sampling and 
threshold fixing 
Not required  Required  Required Required  Required 
Requirement for neighborhood 
check or threshold fixing 
Required Required Required Required  Required 
Requirement to communicate 
with neighbors during jamming 
Required Required Required Required  Required 
Requirement to communicate 
with base-station to report 
jamming 
Required Required Required Required  Required 
Ability to discriminate different 
types of jamming 
Able Unable  Unable  Unable  Unable 
Node over-load assessment (1: 
minimum, 5: maximum) 
2 5 1  3  4 
Accuracy assessment (1: most 
accurate, 5: least accurate) 
3 5 2  4  1 
Speed assessment (1: fastest, 5: 
slowest) 
3 5 4  1  2 
 
4.7. Conclusions from Study of Existing Methods 
 
Some major deductions from the discussion of various jamming-detection methods and their 
comparative study are: that none of the methods, except Xu’s method, is capable of discriminating 
various types of jamming; that they all tax the scarce resources of the nodes; that the decision is taken 
by the nodes based on only its own parameters and those of its neighbors (if spared by the jammer to 
get these) without being aware of the global scenario, and that their detection-quality is highly 
dependent on the ability of the victim nodes to continue communicating with their neighbors or the 
base station despite adverse jamming conditions. The existing methods are capable of detecting all 
jammers, including military warfare jammers; yet they are not suitable for information war because 
they are unable to grade the intensity of jamming experienced by different victim nodes, which is vital 
for further decision making by the battle field commander (or the base station). These inferences lead 
us to conclude that the existing methods are vulnerable to different jamming attacks under organized 
information warfare and, as such, there is a need to devise a method to obviate the vulnerabilities and Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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improve the detection quality with the added ability of quantifying the intensity of jamming at   
different nodes. 
 
5. Proposed Method 
 
5.1. Description 
 
We now propose a fuzzy inference system-based jamming detection method which follows a 
centralized approach, wherein the jamming detection is done by the base station based on the input 
values of the jamming detection metrics received by it from the respective nodes. There are three 
inputs required to be sent by the nodes to the base station: 1) the number of total packets received by it 
during a specified time period, 2) the number of packets dropped by it during the period, and 3) the 
received signal strength (RSS). The former two metrics are normally sent to the base as part of the 
network health monitoring traffic at a pre-decided frequency, as part of most of the existing network 
management protocols. The third metric, RSS has to be additionally sent to the base station in our 
scheme. This can be preferably sent packaged with the former two parameters, or else, sent 
independently. The base station computes the ‘power received by the node from the jammer’, if any, 
by finding the differential between the current RSS and normal RSS values. Thereafter, the base 
station computes the PDPT and SNR from these values, as discussed before. Then the base station uses 
the values of PDPT and SNR as inputs to a fuzzy inference system (Mamdani’s Fuzzy Inference 
System’) to get ‘Jamming Index’ (JI) as output of the system. The JI value varies from 0 to 100, 
signifying ‘No Jamming’ to ‘Absolute Jamming’ respectively. In this way, the base station is able to 
grade the intensity of jamming being experienced by each node through the JI parameter, and thus 
build an overall picture. 
The base station, through the overall picture that it has, is now able to do a confirmatory check 
through neighborhood study of any node to ascertain the correctness of the JI grade allotted to that 
node, as compared to the JI allotted to its neighbor nodes. This is done in our method through an 
algorithm called ‘2-Means Clustering of node Neighborhood’. The elegance of the method lies in 
doing away with the requirement of communicating with the neighbor nodes for neighborhood check. 
This enhances the survivality of the system during jamming. 
Now, depending upon the overall picture and the battle field conditions, the battle field commander 
(or the base station) can decide the lower cut-off value of JI to conclude that all nodes whose JIs are 
greater than the lower cut-off value are ‘Jammed’ while the others are ‘Not Jammed’. The further 
details are described in the sub-sections that follow. 
 
5.1.1. Detection of Jamming Attack on a Node Using Fuzzy Inference System 
 
Definition: Fuzzy Sets and Membership Functions 
Jang et al. [17] define fuzzy sets and membership functions as below. 
If X is a collection of objects, called the universe of discourse (uod) denoted generically by x, then a 
fuzzy set A in X is defined as a set of ordered pairs: Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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  , ( )   :  A A x xx X                                                              (1) 
where  () A x  is called the membership function (MF) for the fuzzy set A. The MF maps each element 
of X to a membership grade (or membership value) between 0 and 1. 
In simple terms, fuzzy means one which cannot be quantified crisply, e.g., the set ‘Tall’ defined 
over the universe of discourse, ‘Height’ (measurable in cm), may mean different things for different 
people. Some may consider persons of height 180 cm or more to be tall, while for others a person of 
height 175 cm may also be tall. Therefore, the set ‘Tall’ is a fuzzy set. It must be noted that while the 
set ‘Tall’ defined over universe of discourse ‘Height’ ( which may generically be denoted by h), is 
fuzzy, the universe of discourse ‘Height’ is a crisp set because its members will assume crisp 
quantifiable values in cm. 
Fuzzy logic is a computational paradigm that provides a mathematical tool for representing and 
manipulating information in a way that resembles human communication and reasoning process [15]. 
We define three fuzzy sets each over the two universes of discourse (inputs), SNR and PDPT: LOW, 
MEDIUM, and HIGH. Four fuzzy sets are defined over the universe of discourse, JI: NO (meaning 
normal), LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH. We use Mamdani model [16], where SNR and BPR (or, PDPT) 
are the crisp inputs to the system and JI is the crisp output obtained from the system after 
defuzzification using the centroid method. 
 
5.1.1.1. Fuzzification Process 
 
Multiple sets of two crisp inputs, SNR and PDPT, as generated through NS2 simulations (the 
simulation set up will be described in Section 6) are first mapped into fuzzy membership functions. A 
trapezoid shape is chosen to define fuzzy membership functions, because of two reasons: firstly, it can 
be mathematically manipulated to be very close to the most natural function, the Gaussian or Bell 
function, and secondly, it can be easily manipulated to be an unsymmetrical function (as required in 
the instant case) where the same cannot be done so easily with the Gaussian or Bell functions. 
We define the membership functions below: 
()
0,              
,    
,           
,    
uod a
ba
uod set d uod
dc
otherwise
a uod b
bu o dc
c uod d



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 (2)
where the different values of the variables are as given in Table 2. The values of the variables, as 
shown in Table 2, have been fixed through two stages: firstly, as per the mean of the values obtained 
from the experts, and secondly, by the correction of these values through a feed-back factor generated 
by comparing the actual result (the output, JI of the system) and the expected result (the JI value, as 
expected by the experts). The graphical representations of these trapezoidal functions in respect of 
SNR, PDPT, and JI are shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Table 2. Values of variables used in definition of membership functions. 
Universe of discourse (uod)  Set  a  b  c  d 
SNR LOW  −0.5 0  1  1.5 
MEDIUM 1  1.5 10  12 
HIGH 10  12  3,900  4,000 
PDPT LOW  −5 0 10  15 
MEDIUM 10  15 25  30 
HIGH 25  30  50  55 
JI NO  −5 0 25  30 
LOW 25  30  50  55 
MEDIUM 50  55 75  80 
HIGH 75  80  100  105 
 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the trapezoidal function for the input signal-to-noise 
ratio (SNR). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the trapezoidal function for the input bad packet ratio 
(BPR) or packets dropped per terminal (PDPT). 
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Figure 3. Graphical representation of the trapezoidal function for the output, jamming 
index (JI). 
 
 
5.1.1.2. Fuzzy Inference  
 
The second step in fuzzy logic processing is fuzzy inference. A rule base, comprising of the range 
of rules consisting of fuzzy outputs corresponding to SNR and PDPT fuzzy inputs, was formed using 
the opinion of experts with rich theoretical and practical experience in jamming and counter jamming 
disciplines of information warfare. The rule base was further refined by vetting the system outputs by 
the experts. The rule base is given as follows: 
1.  If SNR is LOW and PDPT is LOW then JI is HIGH. 
2.  If SNR is LOW and PDPT is MEDIUM then JI is HIGH. 
3.  If SNR is LOW and PDPT is HIGH then JI is HIGH. 
4.  If SNR is MEDIUM and PDPT is LOW then JI is LOW. 
5.  If SNR is MEDIUM and PDPT is MEDIUM then JI is MEDIUM. 
6.  If SNR is MEDIUM and PDPT is HIGH then JI is HIGH. 
7.  If SNR is HIGH and PDPT is LOW then JI is NO. 
8.  If SNR is HIGH and PDPT is MEDIUM then JI is LOW. 
9.  If SNR is HIGH and PDPT is HIGH then JI is MEDIUM. 
 
Figure 4. Input-output surface corresponding to the membership values of inputs (SNR, 
PDPT) and output (JI). 
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Relations obtained from the rule base are interpreted using the minimum operator ‘and’. The 
outputs obtained from the rule base are interpreted using maximum operator ‘or’. The overall input-
output surface corresponding to the above membership functions, values of variables, and rule base is 
depicted in Figure 4.  
 
5.1.1.3. Defuzzification  
 
The outputs of the inference mechanism are fuzzy output variables. The fuzzy logic controller must 
convert its internal fuzzy output variables into crisp values, through the defuzzification process, so that 
the actual system can use these variables. Defuzzification can be performed in several ways. We 
choose the Centroid of Area (COA) method [17]. In this method, the centroid of each membership 
function for each rule is first evaluated. The final output, JI which is equal to COA, is then calculated 
as the average of the individual centroid weighted by their membership values as follows: 
() .
()
b
uod uod set
uod a
b
uod set
uod a
JI COA






 
 
 
(3)
where,  JI or COA is the defuzzification output, uad  and  µset(uad) are input variables and their 
corresponding minimum/maximum values of membership degrees. The complete process of 
calculating the crisp value of jamming index (JI) from input values of SNR and PDPT for every WSN 
node is done with MATLAB-7. 
 
5.1.2. Confirmation of Jamming Attack on a Node Through ‘2-Means Clustering’ of Node 
Neighborhood 
 
After each node has been assigned a crisp jamming index (JI) as per its SNR and PDPT values by 
the base station through the aforesaid method, the base station now confirms whether a node can be 
declared jammed or not jammed by looking at the jamming indices of neighboring nodes. This is done 
by the base station as follows: 
1.  Depending upon the information war conditions, it decides the lower cut-off value of JI, LC for 
declaring all nodes with JI ≥ LC, as jammed nodes, i.e., jamming detected at these nodes. 
2.  It makes a list of all jammed nodes, i.e., of nodes having JI ≥ LC and finds the number, t of such 
nodes. 
3.  For each of the t jammed nodes, it does the following: 
(i)  Identifies and counts the number of one-hop neighbors, n. 
(ii)  Out of the n neighbors, it identifies those neighbors who are in the list of jammed nodes and 
counts their number, nj and names the group of these nodes as jammed neighbors cluster. 
(iii)  Out of the n neighbors, it identifies those neighbors who are not in the list of jammed nodes 
and counts their number (n-  nj) and names the group of these nodes as non-jammed 
neighbors cluster. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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We thus have a total of n nodes divided into 2 clusters in neighborhood of a node under 
consideration. Therefore, the deciding figure is n/2. If the number of nodes (nj) in the 
jammed neighbors cluster is more than n/2 then majority of the neighbors are jammed and 
hence it is confirmed that the node under consideration is also jammed. If nj is less than or 
equal to n/2, further examination is required for taking any decision. The subsequent steps 
of the algorithm proceed accordingly. 
(iv)  If nj > n/2, then it confirms that the node is jammed. 
(v)  If nj ≤ n/2, then it does the following: 
(a) Finds the mean jamming index of jammed neighbors cluster,  jij using the formula: 
1
nj
jik
k
nj
jij

 
 
 
(4)
(b) Finds the mean jamming index of non-jammed neighbors cluster,  jinj using the 
formula: 
1
nn j
jik
k
nn j
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(5)
(c) Finds centroid X and Y coordinates of jammed neighbors cluster using the formula: 
..
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(6)
(d) Finds centroid X and Y coordinates of non-jammed neighbors cluster using the 
formula: 
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(7)
(e) Finds the square of the distance, dj of the node under consideration from the centroid of 
the jammed neighbors cluster using the formula: 
222
() () jj j dx x y y  
                                                    (8
(f) Finds the square of the distance, dnj of the node under consideration from the centroid of 
the non-jammed neighbors cluster using the formula: 
222
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(g) If:  
22
(/ )( / ) ,
jn j jij d jinj d 
 
 
 
then it declares that the node is jammed; otherwise, it declares that the node is not jammed 
and then deletes its name from the list of jammed nodes. 
6. Simulation Set-up and Configuration 
 
6.1. Simulation Parameters for WSN and Jammers 
 
The details of the input parameters used for the simulation in respect of the WSN and those 
parameters which are globally applicable to the jammer-simulation are given in Table 3. 
Table 3. Parameters used for simulating WSN and those parameters which are used for 
simulating jammers. 
Parameter WSN  Jammer 
Frequency (f)  914.634 MHz  914.634 MHz 
Wavelength (λ)  0.328 m  0.328 m 
Antenna gain  1 (0dB)  1 (0dB) 
Antenna directivity  Omni directional Omni  directional 
Transmitted power (Pt)  8.56 × 10
-4 W Variable 
Receiver sensitivity (Prth)  3.652 × 10
-4 W  3.652 × 10
-4 W 
Maximum radio range  40 m  40 m 
Propagation model  Free space  Free space 
Path loss (L)  1 (0dB)  1 (0dB) 
Mode of transmission  Simplex unicast  Simplex broadcast 
Packet size  1000 B  Variable 
Transmission rate  0.01 MBPS  Variable 
Application layer protocol  CBT  CBT 
Transport layer protocol  UDP  UDP 
Network layer protocol (routing Protocol)  AODV  AODV 
MAC protocol  BMAC.  BMAC 
 
6.2. Special Simulation Parameters for Different Types of Jammers 
 
Some parameters which are especially applicable to jammers for simulating different types of 
jammers are as given in Table 4. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Table 4. Parameter values for simulating different types of jammers. 
Type of jammer  Output 
Power (W) 
Packet Size 
(MB) 
Rate 
(MBPS) 
Transmission 
Duration 
Constant Jammer with 
Normal Power (CON) 
8.56 × 10
-4 10,000  10  constant 
Constant Jammer with 
High Power (COH) 
0.2818 10,000 10  Constant 
Deceptive Jammer with 
Normal Power (DECN) 
8.56 × 10
-4 1,000  0.01  Constant 
Deceptive Jammer with 
High Power (DECH) 
0.2818 1,000  0.01 Constant 
Random Jammer 
Imitating CON, (RACN) 
8.56 × 10
-4 10,000  10  Random 
Random Jammer 
Imitating COH, (RACH) 
0.2818 10,000 10  Random 
Random Jammer 
Imitating DECN, 
(RADECN) 
8.56 × 10
-4 1,000  0.01  Random 
 
Random Jammer 
Imitating DECH, 
(RADECH) 
0.2818 1,000  0.01 Random 
Reactive Jammer with 
Normal Power (REN) 
8.56 × 10
-4  1,000  0.01  Whenever there is a legitimate 
transmission between any source and 
the sink. 
Reactive Jammer with 
High Power (REH) 
0.2818  1,000  0.01  Whenever there is a legitimate 
transmission between any source and 
the sink. 
 
The packets dropped per terminal (PDPT) for various types of jammers are as given in Figure 5.  
Figure 5. It shows the average Bad Packets Ratio (BPR) or Packets Dropped per Terminal 
(PDPT) for various jammers and jamming indices for simulation and sampling duration of 
20 seconds. 
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The expansions of acronyms used in Figure 5 are: CON- Constant jammer with Normal Power, 
COH- Constant Jammer with high power, DECN- Deceptive Jammer with Normal Power, DECH- 
Deceptive Jammer with High Power, RACN- Random Jammer Imitating CON, RACH- Random 
Jammer Imitating COH, RADECN- Random Jammer Imitating DECN, RADECH- random Jammer 
Imitating DECH, REN- Reactive Jammer with Normal Power, and REH- Reactive Jammer with High Power. 
 
6.3. Description 
 
The grid topology for the WSN geographical extent was chosen to facilitate analysis of actual and 
predicted results. Six sets of inter-nodal distances: 5, 10,15,20,25, and 30 meters; and four positions for 
the jammer: two inside and two outside the grid were selected for the simulation. Three sets of total 
number (quantity) of nodes: 25, 50, and 100 were considered. Thus a total of 720 simulations (6 inter-
nodal distances X 10 types of jammers X 4 jammer locations X 3 types of node quantity), with 
corresponding aforesaid parameters, were done using the NS2, MATLAB, and Simulink simulator. 
Figure 6 shows the schematic diagram of one of the 720 simulation set-ups, where the inter-nodal 
distance is 20m, the jammer is a constant jammer with high output power, the jammer is located inside 
the WSN grid at coordinates (30,45) with the sink node located at coordinates (85,85), and the WSN 
has a total of 25 nodes. 
Figure 6. Schematic diagram of one of the 720 simulation set-ups, where the inter-nodal 
distance is 20 m, the jammer is a constant jammer with high output power, the jammer is 
located inside the WSN grid at coordinates (30,45) with the sink node located at 
coordinates (85,85), and the WSN has a total of 25 nodes, excluding the sink. 
 
 
7. Results and Performance Evaluation 
 
The results of the system are highly encouraging. We discuss the effects of various parameters on 
the result one by one while keeping the other parameters unchanged. 
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7.1. Inter-nodal Distances  
 
We varied the inter- nodal distance from 5 to 30 meters and observed that the jamming indices of 
the nodes increased as we increased the inter-nodal distance and decreased when we decreased the 
inter-nodal distance. For example, the JIs in respect of Node-13 in the set-up described in Figure 6 
were found to be 44.49, 62.93, 77.21, 88.95, and 98.27 for the inter-nodal distances of 5, 10, 15, 20, 
25, and 30 m respectively, keeping the other factors unchanged. It indicates that a denser WSN is less 
vulnerable to jamming. 
 
7.2. Jammer Type 
 
We found that the effect of different type of jammers is different on the WSN and conforms to the 
expected pattern, wherein their effect, in order of decreasing intensity, is: REH, DECH, REN, DECN, 
RADECH, RADECN, COH, RACH, CON, and RACN. For example, the JIs in respect of Node-13 in 
the set-up described in Figure 6 were found to be 90.16, 90.15, 90.12, 90.11, 89.68, 89.14, 88.95, 
88.72, 77.31, and 75.67 for REH, DECH, REN, DECN, RADECH, RADECN, COH, RACH, CON, 
and RACN respectively. 
 
7.3. Jammer Location 
 
We chose two locations inside and two locations outside the WSN extent randomly. We found that 
the jamming indices of nodes decreased when the jammer was farther and increased when the jammer 
was closer to the nodes. For example, the JIs in respect of Node-13 in the set-up described in Figure 6 
were found to be 94.43, 88.95, and 77.62 for the node-to-jammer distances of 20, 30, and 40 m 
respectively, keeping the other factors unchanged. 
Figure 7. It shows the MATLAB simulation output for the set-up shown by Figure 6. 
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7.4. Number of Nodes in the WSN 
 
We did not find any significant relation between the increase or decrease of jamming indices with 
increase or decrease of the number of nodes. However, we found that the number of jammed nodes 
increased with increase of the total number of nodes and it decreased as the latter was decreased, as 
long as the nodes were within the range of the jammer (40 m and 727 m for the low and high power 
jammers respectively). We now present the results. The MATLAB output of the simulation set-up, 
discussed in Figure 6, is given in Figure 7. Table 5 gives the output values of the simulation results of 
the set-up depicted in Figure 6 and Figure 8 represents the same graphically.  
 
Table 5. Output values of the simulation for the set-up depicted in Figure 6. 
Node 
No. 
X-
coord 
Y-
coord 
Power 
received 
w/o 
jammer 
Pnj (nW) 
Power 
received 
with 
jammer 
Pj (nW) 
Power 
received 
due to 
jammer 
Prdj=(Pj-
Pnj) 
(nW) 
Signal
-to-
noise 
ratio 
SNR 
Packets 
dropped 
per 
terminal 
PDPT 
Jammin
g index 
JI 
Decision for 
LC=75 w/o 
neighborhoo
d check 
Decision 
with 
neighborhood 
check for 
LC=75 
1 20  20  29.45  294.254  264.808  0.111  9.401  88.95  Jammed Jammed 
2 40  20  39.80  304.609  264.808  0.150  10.998  88.72  jammed jammed 
3 60  20  49.13  175.024  125.892  0.387  20.606  88.95  jammed jammed 
4 80  20  54.19  115.692  61.435  0.869  17.518  88.95  Jammed Not  jammed 
5  100  20  49.87  84.617  34.749  1.394  11.429  53.59  Not jammed  Not jammed 
6 20  40  39.71  1575.69  1535.886  0.026  15.584  88.95  Jammed Jammed 
7 40  40  59.46  1595.35  1535.886  0.039  11.685  88.57  Jammed Jammed 
8 60  40  85.08  292.634  207.552  0.408  9.298  88.95  Jammed Jammed 
9  80  40  105.7  181.73  76.034  1.372  12.257  57.95  Not jammed  Not jammed 
10  100  40  94.41  133.392  38.982  2.361  21.084  65  Not jammed  Not jammed 
11 20 60 49.13 639.858  590.725  0.083  11.655  88.58 Jammed  Jammed 
12 40 60 85.09 675.813  590.725  0.144  16.334  88.95 Jammed  Jammed 
13 60 60 206.9 377.517  170.654  0.972  7.818 88.95 Jammed  Jammed 
14  80  60  308.0  378.456  70.453  4.310  7.576  40  Not jammed  Not jammed 
15  100  60  235.4  272.874  37.461  6.120  11.307  46.74  Not jammed  Not jammed 
16 20 80 54.30 199.151  144.895  0.372  21.363  88.95 Jammed  Jammed 
17 40 80 105.7 250.591  144.895  0.724  15.084  88.95 Jammed  Jammed 
18  60  80  308.0  398.349  90.346  3.372  10.027  40.14  Not jammed  Not jammed Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Table 5. Cont. 
 
Figure 8. It graphically represents the output of the simulation for the set-up depicted by Figure 6. 
 
  
We find that there is a relationship between the various types of jammers with respect to the 
jamming indices, the power received at the nodes, and the inter-nodal distances in the WSN. We 
observe that it is possible to detect the type of jammers also through our method by using this 
relationship. The relationship is presented in Table 6. The relationship has to be read row-wise, e.g., 
the first row in the table will read, ‘If the PDPT of the node is from 5 to 10 AND the total received 
power by the node is 300 to 400 nW AND the inter-nodal distances of the node from its neighbors are 
10 to 30 m, then the node is under the attack of a Constant Jammer.’ This table is relevant for all of the 
720 simulations set-ups which we have described. Similar templates will have to be made for other set-
ups. We find that our jammer discrimination results given in our Table 5 matches well with those of 
Xu et al. [1] given in their Figure 7. 
 
 
19  80  80  3852  3903.30  51.534  73.31  6.160  13.53  Not jammed  Not jammed 
20  100  80  777.0  808.371  31.345  24.02  6.821  13.53  Not jammed  Not jammed 
21 20 100  49.87 111.304  61.435 0.799  24.425  88.95 Jammed  Jammed 
22  40  100  94.41  155.845  61.435  1.512  11.553  47.95  Not jammed  Not jammed 
23  60  100  235.4  284.327  48.914  4.716  8.515  40  Not jammed  Not jammed 
24  80  100  777.0  811.775  34.749  21.74  10.025  13.66  Not jammed  Not jammed 
25  100  100  433.4  457.586  24.225  17.18  8.913  13.53  Not jammed  Not jammed 
Node 
Number 
Sink
JI 
It shows WSN node with node 
number inside & JI outside. 
Red colored JI shows 
Jammer 
Sink node 
LEGEND 
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Table 6. Inter-parameter relationships for detecting the type of jamming attack. 
PDPT Total  power 
received (nW) 
Inter-nodal 
distance (m) 
JI  Type of jamming/ 
condition 
5 to10 AND  300 to 400 AND  10 to 30 AND  75 to 90   Constant 
> 20 AND  10 to 300 AND  5 to 30 AND  90 to 100   Deceptive 
> 20 AND  > 400 AND  5 to 10 AND  90 to 100  Reactive 
10 to 20 AND  > 400 AND  5 to 10 AND  50 to 75   Random 
0 to10 AND  10 to 4000 AND  5 to 30 AND  < =50  Normal condition 
 
7.5. Performance Evaluation 
 
Performance evaluation of any model that detects a jamming attack is a difficult proposition 
because there is no known theoretical or practical model that can be taken as a bench-mark for 
comparison. It is perhaps because of this that all of the authors related with jamming detection quoted 
so far, except Cakiroglu et al. [3], have chosen not to evaluate their methods. Even the performance 
evaluation method described by Cakiroglu et al., is ambiguous because they have neither defined the 
‘jammed nodes ratio’ (ratio of the number of nodes successfully jammed by the jammer to the number 
of nodes covered by the jammer?) nor have they described the method to calculate it; but have used it 
to study the performance parameters, ‘detection rate’ and ‘false positive rate’, as a function of the 
‘jammed nodes ratio’. We, therefore first define some terms which we use in our performance 
evaluation and then describe how these are calculated or obtained, where necessary. We then compare 
our results with those of Cakiroglu et al. [3]. 
 
Jammed Nodes Ratio (jnr) is mathematically defined as: 
 
100
          
.
     cov          or          
Number of nodes successfully jammed by the jammer
jnr
Number of nodes ered by the jammer falling within the range of the jammer

 
 
(10)
where, ‘number of nodes successfully jammed by the jammer’ is the number of nodes which have been 
jammed as opined by the panel of experts on the basis of their jamming indices, the lower cut-off value 
of the jamming index as decided by the base station , and other aforesaid simulation parameters. The 
‘number of nodes covered by the jammer’ is the number of nodes which fall within the communication 
range of the jammer (40 m and 727 m for the low and high power jammers respectively in our case). 
True Detection Ratio (TDR) is defined as the ratio of the number of nodes correctly identified by the 
system to be falling under a jamming class (NORMAL, LOW, MEDIUM, or HIGH) to the number of 
such nodes as identified by the panel of experts, taken out of one hundred. 
False Detection Ratio (FDR) is defined as the ratio of the number of nodes incorrectly identified by 
the system to be falling under a jamming class (NORMAL, LOW, MEDIUM, or HIGH) to the number 
of nodes actually falling under that group as identified by the panel of experts, taken out of one hundred. 
We simulated 720 jamming scenarios, as described before. Each of these scenarios was also 
scrutinized by a panel of experts and their findings were obtained. The results as obtained from the Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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system (simulation) and the experts were compared using statistical software, SPSS 11.5. We used the 
chi-square test for grouped comparison of data with degree of freedom (df) being 3 (as the number of 
groups are 4: NORMAL, LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH), and level of significance (p) being 0.05 with 
the corresponding table value to be 7.815 giving a confidence interval of 95%. The test results for one 
of the simulations, as described in Figure 6 and Figure 8, are given in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Test results for one of the simulations, as described in Figure 6 and Figure 8. The 
results pass the chi-square test as the total under (O-E)
2/E, 0 is less than the table value of 
7.815. 
Group of 
JI 
No. of 
nodes 
placed 
by 
system 
(O) 
No. of 
nodes 
placed 
by 
experts 
(E) 
(O-E)
2/E 
No. of nodes 
correctly 
placed by 
system 
(T) 
No. of 
nodes 
incorrectly 
placed by 
system 
(F) 
TDR = 
100.T/E 
FDR = 
100.F/E 
Jnr = 
100.E/
25 
Normal 4  4  0  4 0 100% 0%  16%
Low 5  5  0  5 0 100%  0% 20%
Medium 4  4  0  4 0 100%  0%  16%
High 12  12 0  12 0 100%  0% 48%
Total 25  25 0  25 0 - -  -
 
We mention here that 712 simulations (238 out of 240 for 25-node, 237 out of 240 for 50-node, and 
237 out of 240 for100-node configurations) out of 720 simulations passed the chi-square test. The 
mean TDR and FDR from these 712 simulations were collated for different jammed node ratios (jnr) 
under different configurations (total number of nodes in the simulation, n) for different types of 
jammers. The values of TDR and FDR for 100 nodes configuration for different types of jammers for 
different types of jamming indices are given in Table 8 and Table 9, respectively. 
Table 8. It shows the values of TDR for 100 nodes configuration for different types of 
jammers, JIs and jnr. 
Jammer Type 
True Detection Ratio (TDR %) for 100 nodes configuration 
           25 < JI < =50                50 < JI < = 75                75 < JI < = 100 
jnr 
25%  
jnr 
50% 
jnr 
100% 
jnr 
25%  
jnr 
50% 
jnr 
100% 
jnr 
25%  
jnr 
50% 
jnr 
100% 
DECH  99.55  99.6 99.85  99.45  99.5 99.75  99.50  99.6 99.8 
COH  99.5 99.6 99.8 99.40  99.55  99.75  99.45  99.6 99.8 
DECN  99.45  99.5 99.6 99.35  99.4 99.5 99.35  99.5 99.6 
CON  99.35 99.5  99.6  99.15 99.45 99.5  99.25 99.5  99.55 
REH  99.25  99.4 99.55  99.10  99.2 99.25  99.20  99.3 99.4 
REN  99.20  99.3 99.5 99.00  99.1 99.25  99  99.2 99.3 
RADECH  99.15 99.25 99.4  99.00 99.05 99.10 99.05 99.1  99.2 
RADECN  99.05 99.20 99.25 98.90 99  99.10 98.95 99  99.1 
RACH  98.90 99.10 99.15 98.80 98.90 99  98.90 98.95 99.1 
RACN  99.00 99.05 99.10 98.60 98.70 98.8  98.85 98.9  99 Sensors 2010, 10                                       
 
 
3471
Table 9. It shows the values of FDR for 100 nodes configuration for different types of 
jammers, jnr and JIs. 
Jammer Type 
False Detection Ratio (FDR %) for 100 nodes configuration 
           25 < JI < = 50                50 < JI < = 75                75 < JI < = 100 
jnr 
25%  
jnr 
50% 
jnr 
100% 
jnr 
25%  
jnr 
50% 
jnr 
100% 
jnr 
25%  
jnr 
50% 
jnr 
100% 
RADECH  0.6 0.3 0  0.7 0.4 0  0.55  0.25  0 
RADECN  0.5 0.25  0  0.6 0.3 0  0.5 0.2 0 
DECH  0.45  0.2 0  0.5 0.3 0  0.4 0.1 0 
COH  0.3  0.01 0  0.35 0.02 0  0.2  0  0 
REH  0.25 0.1  0  0.28 0.12 0  0.2  0.1  0 
RACH  0.05 0.04 0  0.06 0.05 0  0.04 0.03 0 
RACN  0.03 0.02 0  0.04 0.03 0  0.03 0.01 0 
REN  0.01 0.01 0  0.02 0.02 0  0.01 0.01 0 
DECN  0.01 0.01 0  0.02 0.01 0  0.01 0  0 
CON  0.01 0.01 0  0.01 0.01 0  0.01 0  0 
DECH  0.45  0.2 0  0.5 0.3 0  0.4 0.1 0 
DECN  0.01 0.01 0  0.02 0.01 0  0.01 0  0 
 
Figures 9, 10, and 11 show the values of TDR for 100 nodes configuration for different types of 
jammers and jnr for jamming indices of 25–50, 50–75, and 75–100% respectively. 
Figure 9. Graphic representation of TDR for different jnr for 100 nodes configuration for 
25< JI < = 50. 
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Figure 10. Graphic representation of TDR for different jnr for 100 nodes configuration for 
50 < JI < = 75. 
 
Figure 11. Graphic representation of TDR for different jnr for 100 nodes configuration for 
75 < JI < = 100. 
 
We now compare our performance evaluation parameters, TDR and FDR with their corresponding 
counter-parts in the model by Cakiroglu et al., ‘Detection Rate’ and ‘False Positive Rate’ in Tables 10 
and 11 respectively, as they have now been reduced to an almost matching denominator. However, the 
comparison is to be studied with caution as the model by Cakiroglu et al. have preferred to use the 
Gilbert-Elliot model for simulating transmission losses based on two event discreet Markov chain, as 
they consider that the radio unit provides either good or bad transmission service.  
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Table 10. Comparison of TDR% (proposed model) and ‘Detection Rate %’( model by 
Cakiroglu  et al.). The asterisk mark (*) shows those readings where the model by 
Cakiroglu  et al. is better than the proposed model. Elsewhere, the proposed model’s 
performance is either matching or better. 
Type of jammer 
TDR% (proposed model) and ‘Detection Rate %’( model by 
Cakiroglu et al.) 
Proposed 
model 
Cakiroglu et al. 
equivalent 
jnr 
25% 
jnr 
50% 
jnr 
100% 
Proposed Cakiroglu Proposed Cakiroglu Proposed Cakiroglu
DECH  Deceptive  (bad)  99.45 99.35  99.5    99.38  99.75 99.44 
COH  Constant  (bad)  99.40 99.32  99.55 99.37  99.75 99.42 
DECN  Deceptive  99.35 99.25  99.40 99.29  99.50 99.43 
CON  Constant  99.15 99.20  *  99.45 99.28  99.50 99.34 
REH  Reactive  (bad)  99.10 99.15* 99.20 99.18  99.25 99.32* 
REN  Reactive  99.00 99.05* 99.10 99.10  99.25 99.25 
RADECH  Random  (bad)  99.00 99.06* 99.05 99.06* 99.10 99.16* 
RADECN  -  98.90 -  99.00 -  99.10 - 
RACH  -  98.80 -  98.90 -  99.00 - 
RACN  Random  98.60 98.82* 98.70 98.90* 98.80 99.10* 
Table 11. Comparison of FDR% (proposed model) and ‘False Positive Rate %’( model by 
Cakiroglu et al.). The proposed model’s performance values are either better or matching 
with those of the model by Cakiroglu et al. 
Type of jammer 
FDR% (proposed model) and ‘False Positive Rate %’( model by 
Cakiroglu et al.) 
Proposed 
model 
Cakiroglu et al. 
equivalent 
jnr 
25% 
jnr 
50% 
jnr 
100% 
Proposed  Cakiroglu Proposed Cakiroglu  Proposed Cakiroglu
RADECH Random  (bad)  0.7  0.8  0.4  0.51  0  0 
RADECN -  0.6  -  0.3  -  0  - 
DECH Deceptive  (bad)  0.5  0.57 0.3 0.4 0  0 
COH  Constant  (bad)  0.35  0.38  0.02 0.04 0  0 
REH  Reactive  (bad)  0.28  0.3  0.12 0.13 0  0 
RACH -  0.06  -  0.05  -  0  - 
RACN  Random  0.04  0.05  0.03 0.03 0  0 
REN  Reactive  0.02  Not clear  0.02  Not clear  0  0 
DECN  Deceptive  0.02  Not clear  0.01  Not clear  0  0 
CON  Constant  0.01  Not clear  0.01  Not clear  0  0 
 
We thus find that our performance parameters indicate good results and are either better or 
matching with the existing methods of jamming detection in wireless sensor networks whose figures 
are publically available. 
We evaluated our approach with CBR traffic (a rather high traffic), and one may wonder whether 
the approach would also work for other traffic patterns, e.g., in a setting where the nodes usually do Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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not communicate at all, or communicate only very rarely. In such a scenario, the PDPT could be very 
low, and in the worst case it could be zero. However, the SNR may or may not be low. Therefore, both 
PDPT and SNR will definitely have some value as defined by Equation 2 and Table 2. Accordingly, 
one of the nine rules given in the rule base under Section 5.1.1.2 (most probably, either of Rule 1, or 
Rule 4, or Rule 7) will be invoked, and the JI will be computed accordingly without any prejudice to 
the accuracy of the jamming detection. We thus conclude that the method is effective for all types of 
traffic patterns. 
 
7.6. Evaluation of Base Station-Centric (Centralized) Versus Node-Centric (Decentralized) Approaches 
 
We will now examine the performance of our proposed base-centric (centralized) approach vis-à-vis 
the existing approaches, all of them being node-centric (decentralized) from various angles as follows. 
 
7.6.1. Communication Energy Efficiency 
 
We assume that the inter-nodal distance (hop distance) between any two nodes is the same. 
Let:  
e be the energy in joules required for transmission of one packet over one hop, and 
h be the number of hops between a typical node to the base station.  
In the proposed system, the node transmits only one additional packet containing its RSS value to 
the base station. If the nodes communicate frequently with the base station (sink) in the normal traffic 
pattern, the jamming-related data (the RSS packet) can be piggybacked with this traffic reducing the 
overhead. If, however, the normal traffic is very low, then the packet has to be sent independently 
which will increase the overhead. We will consider the latter case (the worse case). Let f be the number 
of such jamming-related data (the RSS packet) being sent by a typical node to the base station (sink) 
per second. Therefore, the total energy consumed per second for communication in the proposed 
centralized system, Ec-cent in joules is: 
Ec-cent = efh                                                                      (11) 
Under the existing approaches (the decentralized approaches), e.g., in the models suggested by Xu 
et al. [1], Rajani et al. [2], and Cakiroglu et al. [3], the nodes have to communicate with their 
neighbors for neighborhood check or for sampling and threshold fixing. In these approaches, if a node 
has n neighbors, it has to send minimum one packet to each neighbor and receive one packet from each 
neighbor for neighborhood check. Let the frequency of this neighborhood-check (or, the number of 
time-windows during which metric-samples from neighbors are to be collected per second, as done in 
some cases, be t (t may be less than 1). Therefore, the minimum number of packets exchanged per hop 
per suspected jamming attack is 2nt. If j is the average number of suspected jamming attacks per 
second, then the energy required for communication with the neighbors is 2ntej joules per second. The 
nodes under the decentralized approach are then required to communicate to the base station if they 
detect jamming. Assuming that a fraction k of the j suspected jamming attacks are detected to be actual 
jamming, the node has to communicate kj times per second with the base station. Assuming further 
that the node sends only one packet per such communication, the energy required for this Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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communication is ejkh joules per second. We thus have the total energy required for communication 
under the decentralized system in joules per second, Ec-decent given as: 
Ec-decent = 2ntej + ejkh  (12)
For our proposed (centralized) system to be more communication energy efficient than the existing 
(decentralized) approaches, Ec-cent must be less than Ec-decent, i.e., 
efh < 2ntej + ejkh  (13)
or, f < j(2nt/h + k) (14)
Therefore, as evident from Inequality 14, our method (the centralized approach) can be only 
conditionally more communication energy-efficient than the existing (decentralized) approaches. It can 
thus be concluded that whether a distributed or centralized approach is more communication energy 
efficient depends on the communication pattern of the application.  
  
7.6.2. Computational Energy Efficiency 
 
The energy consumption for computation of jamming detection for both approaches, centralized or 
decentralized, is the same for the same algorithm. However, the centralized system has the advantage 
of spending that energy from the base station and saving the same at the energy-starved nodes. 
Therefore, the centralized approach is decidedly better than the decentralized approach in this aspect.  
 
7.6.3. Speed of Jamming Detection 
 
The decentralized approach is undoubtedly much faster than the centralized approach as the latter is 
based on distributed processing. However, the jamming detection is done for a greater purpose like 
mapping the jammed area, localizing and tracking the jammer, and taking counter-jamming actions at 
different layers. An over-all global picture must be built to meet the purpose. In the decentralized 
approach, the base station has to build-up the over-all picture almost de-novo, whereas, in the 
centralized approach, the over-all picture is almost simultaneously built along with the process of 
detection. This aspect compensates the slow speed of the centralized approach and places it at par with 
the decentralized approach. 
Let us also do the time complexity analysis of our proposed method which uses two different 
algorithms: Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) and 2-Means Clustering (TMC). 
For the FIS, the time function is given as: 
T(N) = k1Ns
u + k2,                                                                   (15) 
where N is the number of iterations (i.e., N is the number of nodes), s is the number of fuzzy sets 
defined for the input (s = 3 in our case, i.e., LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH), u is the number of inputs  
(u = 2 in our case, i.e., SNR and PDPT), and k1 and k2 are constants. Therefore, 
T(n) = 9k1N + k2,                                                                  (16) 
Therefore, the time complexity of FIS is of O(N). Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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In the TMC, we have four un-nested loops defined by equations 4 to 6, each running from 1 to nj or 
(n-nj), where n and nj are the ‘number of one-hop neighbors’ and the ‘number of jammed one-hop 
neighbors’ respectively of the node under consideration. Since, the maximum value which nj or (n-nj) 
can take in these loops is bounded by n/2; the maximum number of possible iterations in any of these 
un-nested loops is limited to n/2. There are a total of t jammed nodes for which the TMC has to be 
applied. Therefore, the time taken by the algorithm, T is: 
T = k3 (n/2) t + k4,                                                    (17) 
where  k3 and k4 are constants. Since both, t and n are bounded by the upper limit N, the time 
complexity of TMC is of O(N
2). Thus, the overall time complexity of the two algorithms taken 
together is of O(N
2). 
In absolute terms, the total time taken to process 25 nodes in a WSN configuration as depicted in 
Figure 6 using vectors and ‘tic’ and ‘toc’ commands of MATLAB7 on a 2.4 GHz Pentium computer 
for FIS and TMC together was found to be 0.797 seconds. 
 
7.6.4. Accuracy of Detection 
 
The centralized approach is decidedly more accurate than the decentralized approach because the 
former is based on local as well as global conditions while the latter is based only on the local 
conditions. This has amply been established by the high TDR and low FDR of our method, as 
discussed in preceding sections. 
  
8. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
We first discussed and analyzed the various types of jamming attack models, the determinant 
metrics for jamming detection, and the existing methods of jamming detection as applied to the 
wireless sensor networks. We also discussed how our approach to the problem differed from the 
existing ones from three angles: (1) the scope of the lethality of the jammer being enlarged to include 
military jammers, (2) the existing approaches consider only two discreet levels of jamming, jammed 
and not jammed; where as we consider that decision about whether a node is jammed or not jammed is 
a fuzzy one and accordingly, aim to grade different node as per their jamming indices which suits the 
information war environment allowing various options to the war- zone commander (or, base station) 
in adopting different policies with respect to victimized nodes, and (3) the decision for jamming 
detection is taken by the nodes themselves in the existing methods, which we consider not feasible due 
to the resource constraints of the WSN nodes and their ineffectiveness in communicating with other 
nodes during jamming, and accordingly, we choose to do all processing and decision making at the 
base station on a holistic picture. Having done so, we then selected packets dropped per terminal 
(PDPT) and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) as the input to our fuzzy inference system based on Mamdani 
model which gave the jamming index (JI) of various nodes as output. This output is further evaluated 
on an overall picture based on the neighborhood of the nodes. We then evaluated the system 
performance through the true detection ratio (TDR) and false detection ratio (FDR), and then we 
compared the performance with the method proposed by Cakiroglu et al. and found that our Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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performance is better in most of the cases, matching in few cases, and not as good as the others in rare 
cases. We are unable to compare our performance with those of other existing models because their 
quantitative performance evaluation parameters are not publically available. We also analyzed the 
performance of the proposed approach (centralized or base-centric approach) against the existing 
approaches (decentralized or node-centric approach) and found that the proposed approach is matching 
with the existing approaches in terms of speed and energy consumption and is better in terms of 
accuracy. Our model has the unique advantages of providing flexibility to the battle field commander 
(base station) in resource (node) utilization through grading the nodes with jamming indices, and of 
survivality in an information war, as the model is procedure-based as against protocol-based, with the 
latter involving inter-node communication in a jamming environment which may not be always 
possible. The proposed method has the additional advantage of being able to discriminate various types 
of jamming attacks without getting into the complexities of digital signal processing which must be 
avoided as they are not practicable in the WSN scenario in an information warfare environment.  
We find that our algorithm for confirmation of jamming attack on a node through ‘2-means 
clustering’ of node neighborhood can be refined for its performance with respect to the edge nodes, 
especially those in the corners. We understand that this can be done by addition of steps for 
discriminating edge and corner nodes from the rest and allotting various allowances to them for loss of 
prospective jammed or un-jammed neighbors in our algorithm. We plan to undertake this task as our 
future work. 
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